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Abstract 
This report provides summary of the project “Exploration of methods for using SACADA data to 
estimate HEPs”. The goal of the project was to conduct exploratory research on how to use the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s SACADA (Scenario, Authoring, Characterization, and 
Debriefing Application) database to develop an algorithm for estimating human error 
probabilities (HEPs).   The approach used by the University of Maryland SyRRA lab uses a 
combination of Bayesian statistical methods and Bayesian Network models to conduct data 
analysis on SACADA data and to construct hybrid models informed by both data and 
engineering models. The end results provided various algorithms for mapping and binning 
SACADA data to be used within HEP estimation, and demonstrated a variety of options which 
create a framework for streamlined updating of HEPs as the amount and variety of SACADA 
data increases. This report summarizes the project's major accomplishments, and gathers the 




Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is the aspect of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is 
concerned with systematically identifying and analyzing the causes and consequences of human 
errors. There are numerous HRA methods that provide guidance for determining the human error 
probability (HEP), which is the (conditional) probability of a human failure event (HFE), given 
the context of various parameters and contextual factors which are often called performance 
influencing factors (PIFs).  
A critical challenge for the field of HRA is the need for traceable, data-informed models which 
provide a defensible basis for risk-informed decision making. Currently the NRC is pursing data 
collection through the recently developed SACADA framework and database.  SACADA provides 
a common basis and structure for HRA data collection, analysis, and exchange. Currently the 
structure of the SACADA database is final. However, the SACADA database is continually 
growing in content. According to recent information from NRC, SACADA currently contains the 
results from approximately 35 scenarios with results coming from both published international 
simulator experiments and non-published operator training activities. At this stage, an important 
research question emerges: how can the SACADA data be used to improve HEP estimation for 
HRA? 
This report describe the results of a project “Exploration of methods for using SACADA data to 
estimate HEPs”. The goal of the work conducted by the University of Maryland SyRRA lab is to 
use of Bayesian statistical methods and Bayesian Network models to conduct data analysis on 
SACADA data and to construct hybrid models informed by both data and engineering models. The 
end results provided various algorithms for mapping and binning SACADA data to be used within 
HEP estimation, and demonstrated a variety of options which create a framework for streamlined 
updating of HEPs as the amount and variety of SACADA data increases. 
The project produced the following results: (1) An algorithm for using SACADA data to develop 
a qualitative and quantitative basis for estimating human error probabilities (HEPs) and (2) 
documentation of literature findings, methodology, approach, and findings in presentations and 
reports.  
Summary of Work 
The primary objective the proposed work was to explore approaches and methods for using the 
SACADA context elements and data to enhance the estimation of HEPs. To achieve this objective, 
the SyRRA group proposed to use Bayesian statistical methods and Bayesian Networks to enable 
the use of qualitative and quantitative information from SACADA. Bayesian methods were 
 selected because of their ability to formally combine various types of data for use in predictive 
model building as well as in developing numerical estimates for human error probabilities (HEPs). 
A key benefit of the Bayesian approach for HRA is that it enables various amounts of simulator 
data to be used to enhance the technical basis of HRA methods, and furthermore, it is an iterative 
process that can be used to continually improve HRA as the data content of SACADA expands 
[1]. 
There are multiple activities which were conducted in support of this goal. Activities included: 
• A literature review and familiarization with SACADA structure and data types
5 
• Developing a mapping that relates elements of SACADA (including the contextual factors,
the scenario elements, and the performance outcomes) onto various HRA concepts
(including human error probability (HEP), performance shaping factors (PSFs)).
• Running mathematical and statistical analyses designed to visualize, categorize, and cluster
the data and parameterize models.
• Development of a demonstration or materials to effectively communicate the methods and
results
The first step was to develop the framework for the analysis; this is documented in a conference 
paper [2] presented at the PSAM conference and enclosed in this report as Appendix A. A second 
activity involved development of the full algorithm; this has been documented in a draft journal 
paper which is enclosed in this report as Appendix B.  
Key challenges were encountered in enabling SACADA data to be used within HEP quantification 
across multiple performance contexts and multiple levels of abstraction. It is necessary to map 
multiple data sources (SACADA, cognitive literature, existing HRA methods) onto a single, 
consistent terminology framework. However, each source of data contains up to 200 relevant 
variables or data collection elements, and completing this mapping process is recommended as 
follow-on work.   
As part of the demonstration development, we sought to develop a MATLAB demo of the 
algorithm. However, we ran into some limitations in available prior information, the need to map 
over 200 variables, and code modernization needs of the Bayes Net Toolbox (BNT) [3] for 
MATLAB [4]. We envision that the Matlab demo would contain a series of MATLAB routines to 
extract and catalog the necessary states as well as tally their frequency according to their SACADA 
situational factors.  Further based on the SACADA states, the code also extracts the state associated 
PIFs and their characteristics based on the initial state-to-PIF map that was designed for this 
project. BNs for each MCF would be developed and implemented via the BNT. However because 
the BNT is no longer maintained by the original creators, several modifications would be necessary 
in order to update the package to be compatible with the current version of Matlab. Development 
of a Matlab demo is recommended as part of follow-on work.  
Appendix C contains information gathered to be used in a demonstration of the algorithm. 
Appendix C1 contains a table of published, expert-elicited probabilities for specific PSFs used in 
the SPAR-H model [5, 6]). These could be used to generate prior probabilities for the Pr(PSF), but 
would require mapping from the variables in SPAR-H onto the variables in the causal models.  
Appendix C2 contains graphical models which were developed in GeNie [7], based on a study by 
Whaley et. al [8].  We created models for the in macro cognitive function (MCF) “failure of 
detecting and noticing” to demonstrate the concept. For a full-scale model, it would be necessary 
to model the additional MCFs in the future [9, 8].  The setup for this involved writing fifteen 
associated causal graphical models relating the  PIFs (from the hierarchy defined by Groth and 
Mosleh [10] (see Appendix C3).  The current graphical models assume PIF independence; this 
simplification was necessary to enable meeting project objectives within the project timeframe; an 
important next step is to revise the BNs to include PIF-to-PIF dependencies to correctly capture 
the cognitive literature via the algorithm from [11] which is incorporated in our algorithm. 
6 
Finally, the SACADA states that were provided in the data spreadsheets required a correlation map 
that defined the states as PIFs and PIF characteristics defined by Groth and Mosleh [10] and by 
Chang et. al [12].  This was an extensive mapping project where the SyRRA group had to define 
PIFs and characteristics for over 200 separate SACADA states where a draft is presented in 
Appendix C4. 
Publications & Presentations 
• Final copy of PSAM conference paper “A framework for using SACADA to enhance the
qualitative and quantitative basis of HRA” by Katrina Groth [2] (Enclosed in this report as
Appendix A).
K. Groth, "A framework for using SACADA to enhance the qualitative and
quantitative basis of HRA," in Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management
PSAM 14, September 17-21, 2018, Los Angeles, CA, 2018.
• Dr. Groth organized a special session on HRA data analysis at PSAM 14. The session
consisted of 2 paper sessions (comprising 8 technical papers) and 1 panel session consisting
of 5 invited speakers with Dr. Groth serving as moderator.
• A draft of a journal paper “A hybrid approach to HRA using simulator data, causal models,
and cognitive science” by Katrina Groth, Reuel Smith, and Ramin Moradi [9] (Enclosed in
this report as Appendix B).
K. M. Groth, R. C. Smith and R. Moradi, "A hybrid approach to HRA using
simulator data, causal models, and cognitive science," In Production, 2018.
• (Presentation) K. Groth “Exploration of methods for using SACADA data to Bayesian
update HEPs” at the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Human Reliability Analysis
Data Workshop, March 15, 2018.
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 14, September 2018, Los Angeles, CA 
A framework for using SACADA to enhance the qualitative and 
quantitative basis of HRA 
 
Katrina M. Groth* 
 
Systems Risk and Reliability Analysis Lab, Center for Risk and Reliability, Department of Mechanical 





Abstract: The purpose of this research is to explore ways to use Bayesian methods with data from the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Scenario, Authoring, Characterization, and Debriefing 
Application (SACADA) system. SACADA is a database designed to enable collection of nuclear 
power plant (NPP) control room simulator and crew training data to improve both operator training 
and human reliability analysis (HRA). This paper presents a framework to use SACADA data and 
causal modeling to enhance the qualitative and quantitative aspects of HRA. The framework is a 
multi-faceted approach involving causal models as well as multiple sources and types of data. 
Elements of the framework include a comprehensive set of performance influencing factors, crew 
failure modes, Bayesian Network causal models, Bayesian parameter updating, and temporal 
modeling. This paper also outlines a path forward for developing the framework to enhancing the 
technical basis of HRA and enabling streamlined use of SACADA data as the volume and variety of 
data increases. 
 




A critical challenge for the field of human reliability analysis (HRA) is the need for traceable, data-
informed models that provide a defensible basis for risk-informed decision making. Currently the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is pursing data collection through the recently developed 
Scenario, Authoring, Characterization, and Debriefing Application (SACADA) framework and 
database [1]. The SACADA database is one of several international data collection activities focused 
on collecting human performance data from nuclear power plant (NPP) control room simulator 
scenarios. It also offers a common basis and structure for HRA data collection, analysis, and 
exchange. SACADA is actively being populated with data and, in parallel, the initial data is being 
analyzed  to provide insight into the development and use of SACADA [2].  
 
As SACADA and similar databases become more mature, an important research question emerges: 
how can this data be used to improve HRA? As a first step toward answering that question, the U.S. 
NRC asked three teams to develop methods for using SACADA data to quantify the probability of a 
human failure event associated with a given performance context. In HRA, this quantity is called the 
human error probability (HEP), which is a conditional probability with the conditioning factors 
representing the context of performance in terms of performance influencing factors (PIFs), also called 
performance shaping factors (PSFs). This paper is one outcome of the analysis being conducted by the 
University of Maryland. The methods developed by the two other teams are also presented in papers at 
this conference [3], [4]. 
 
This paper defines a framework for using SACADA data to improve both the qualitative and 
quantitative basis of HRA using causal Bayesian Networks and Bayesian parameter updating. The 
SACADA data is described in Section 2 of this paper. Section 3 describes the approach to 
development of the framework. The proposed framework is described in Section 4.  
                                                     
* kgroth@umd.edu 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF SACADA DATA
2.1. Database structure 
The SACADA data taxonomy is described in detail in [1] and the current state of development is also 
described in another paper in this conference [2]. SACADA collects data about multiple facets of crew 
and system (machine) performance in NPP control rooms. SACADA provides a detailed structure for 
collecting information about the characteristics of a simulator scenario, the plant conditions, a task-
level breakdown of activities involved in responding to conditions in those scenarios, crew roles, and 
the performance outcome (aggregated at the task-level) for multiple crews that have performed the 
scenario. SACADA provides a common set of elements for capturing the context of the scenario 
(which is generally the same across all crews), and a set of performance factors that are used for 
debriefing crews when performance is considered less-than-satisfactory.†  
Each scenario starts with a plant initial condition and contains one or more plant malfunctions that are 
pre-programmed to occur in the simulator during the exercise. These scenarios are designed before the 
crews are run on the scenario, and multiple crews run each scenario.  
Each scenario is decomposed into a series of tasks or training objective elements (TOE), each of which 
represents one activity that the crews must complete to respond to the specified plant condition or 
malfunction. The TOE is the basic data unit for SACADA. In general, there are several TOEs involved 
in the response to each malfunction in a scenario. Each TOE is associated with one of five 
macrocognitive functions: monitoring/detecting; diagnosis; response planning/decision making; 
manipulation/execution; and communication/coordination.‡ Example TOEs include things like “ensure 
the charging cooling pump 1A is in service,” “announce transition to procedure [number]” and 
“monitor [system X] and identify increasing trend in pressure.” From an HRA perspective, these TOEs 
resemble tasks or sub-tasks. Many HRA methods are designed to be used at the scenario or event 
level, and thus would include multiple TOEs. 
For each TOE, the data collection team characterizes the context of the scenario using situational 
factors (SFs), which are similar to the HRA concepts of PIFs. There are approximately 29 SFs in 
SACADA, although only a subset are used for each TOE depending on which type of macrocognitive 
function is associated with the TOE. Some of these factors are rated as one of two states 
(present/absent), some have up to four states, and some represent a summation of multiple constituent 
factors rated on the two point (present/absent) scale, as described in [1]. The SFs document the context 
of each TOE, and they do not change depending on which crew is running the scenario. The outcome 
of the crew performance for each TOE is ranked on a four-point scale (ordered from best to worst 
performance, where “SAT” is an abbreviation of the word satisfactory): SAT+, SAT, SAT∆, UNSAT. 
For crews that receive a score of SAT∆ or UNSAT, a second worksheet is completed to capture the 
causes of the degraded performance. The worksheet contains approximately 21 performance factors 
(PFs) that are also similar to PIFs. As with SFs, only a subset of the PFs are used depending on which 
macrocognitive functions are involved. Several of the PF factors are rated as being in one of two states 
(present/absent), some have up to six states, and some represent a summation of multiple factors rated 
on the two point (present/absent) scale as described in [1]. These PFs are used to describe the reasons 
for errors (or near misses) for the crew on a specific TOE. 
2.2. Current data 
† Satisfactory performance is defined from a training perspective. Use of this data for HRA purposes requires 
some additional considerations, which are described later in this paper. 
‡ In SACADA, this is defined as “external communication,” meaning communication beyond the crew or team. 
It is worth noting that this may be a narrower interpretation of the macrocognitive concept of “communication,” 
which also involves the concept of teamwork and within-team communication. 
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This section provides summary information about the current SACADA data set provided for 
descriptive purposes. It is important to caution against misinterpretation of the summary information 
provided in this section. Because of the causal nature of the underlying factors, the author cautions that 
no statistics of conclusions about HRA or human performance should be drawn from these 
descriptive data, because they are aggregated across contexts and because not all combinations 
of contexts are represented in the current data. Some contexts may be over- or under-represented 
in the training data when compared to the contexts experienced in real operational events.  
 
As of July 2017, SACADA contains data from 86 simulator scenarios with results coming from both 
published international simulator experiments and non-published operator training activities. Within 
these 86 scenarios, there are 329 malfunctions and a total of 2,155 TOEs. Each scenario was 
performed by several crews, and on average each TOE was performed by 12 crews. In total, the 
current SACADA database contains 26,153 crew-TOEs (this number represents the sum-product of 
the 2,155 TOEs and the variable number of crews that attempted each TOE). Of the 2,155 TOEs, 149 
TOEs had one or more crews with a rating of UNSAT and 219 TOEs with a rating of SAT∆. Of the 
26,153 crew-TOE data points, there were 209 scores of UNSAT and 261 scores of SAT∆. 
 
3. APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK 
 
After initial analysis of the SACADA data and review of existing HRA needs, the next step was to 
consider the desirable factors of the framework for using this data to enhance HRA. The approach to 
development of the proposed method was based on the desirable characteristics of advanced HRA 
methods outlined by many HRA studies (e.g., [5]). In particular, it was decided that during the first 
stage of this work, the method should meet the following criteria: 
 
1. The proposed method should be based on a causal model of human-machine performance.§ 
That model should be rooted in both cognitive science and systems science.  
2. The structure of the model should provide explicit representation of the causal factors that 
affect human-machine performance. 
3. The method should support the quantitative and qualitative aspects of HRA as a part of 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), including quantification of HEPs. 
4. The method should provide a framework that is both data-informed and model-informed. 
5. The method should be flexible enough to accommodate changes in SACADA structure as 
SACADA is developed further.  
6. The method should be able to incorporate additional data, models, and information to address 
contexts or factors that are not represented in SACADA. 
7. The framework should be capable of providing quantitative insights that can be used to help 
the data collection teams improve human performance (e.g., via training). 
 
4. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
 
The main elements that are included in the proposed framework are illustrated in Figure 1. These 
elements are a comprehensive set of PIFs, human failure modes, Bayesian Network causal models, 
Bayesian parameter updating, and temporal evolutional of performance. Each of these elements is 
described in more detail in this section. 
 
                                                     
§ I use the term “human-machine performance” to emphasize that there is an important role of both machines and 
humans in the concept of human reliability. 
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Figure 1: Main elements of the proposed framework for using SACADA to enhance HRA 
 
 
4.1 A comprehensive set of PIFs 
 
The first element in the proposed framework is a comprehensive taxonomy of PIFs [6]. The taxonomy 
provides a consistent vocabulary and structure for combining data and information from multiple 
sources and at multiple levels of detail in a transparent and repeatable way. The Groth and Mosleh 
taxonomy also provides non-overlapping, orthogonal set of causal factors, meaning that each PIF is 
defined uniquely. The term “orthogonal” is used to indicate that, while the factors are uniquely 
defined, they may not be independent in a statistical or causal sense.  
 
4.2 Human-machine team failure modes  
 
This aspect of the framework involves having a defined set of failure modes for the human-machine 
team. These capture the ways that the human-machine teams could fail in responding to a condition or 
malfunction. The term “human-machine failure mode” is designed to reflect that the HRA concept of a 
human failure event (HFE) involves a contribution from both the human response and the machine 
response. In the proposed framework, each of these failure modes would be represented in a causal 
model as described in Section 4.3. 
 
The definition of these human-machine team failures modes could be achieved via multiple 
approaches. One option is to use the failure modes or failure-mode-identification approaches defined 
by the existing HRA methods, which acknowledge both a cognitive and a machine element (e.g., 
methods such as IDA [7], IDAC [8] IDHEAS [9], or PHOENIX [10] and HRA research activities 
[11]–[15]). Another option is to use first-principles reliability techniques (e.g. by doing a “human-
machine” FMEA or HAZOP with consideration of macrocognitive functions and machine functions). 
Another approach would be to define one failure mode for each of the five macrocognitive functions 
used in SACADA.  
 
4.3 Bayesian Network (BN) causal models 
 
In the proposed framework, BN causal models are used to capture the detailed causal pathways and 
interdependencies among PIFs. In this framework, BNs are used because of their ability to model 
cause-and-effect relationships and the use of probabilistic inference. Furthermore, BNs provide the 
ability to reason about any variable in the model, enabling quantitative insights relevant to improving 
performance. 
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This approach will allow all relevant PIFs (both observable and unobservable) to be used in model 
development. In addition, it enables the explicit inclusion of data collection elements within the model 
structure, and these data collection elements could enable using data from different versions of 
SACADA.  
 
These causal relationships would be initially developed from cognitive science and systems science, 
and could eventually be developed or validated by using SACADA data. The BN model will be 
developed by creating an explicit map between PIFs (first element described above) and the human-
machine team failure modes (second element described above). This could be accomplished by using 
the causal mapping approach developed and illustrated in the work of Zwirglmaier, Straub, and Groth 
[16]. The starting point for development of this causal mapping has been developed as part of NRC’s 
work on defining a cognitive basis for HRA [17], [18] and in the IDAC model [19]. The size of the 
resulting BN models could be reduced (e.g., to facilitate quantification) by using node reduction 
algorithms [16]. A second approach would be to follow the approach of [20] and use factor analysis 
clustering, or structure learning algorithms techniques directly on the SACADA data.  
 
4.4 Data and Bayesian parameter updating 
 
The quantitative parameters of the BN models would be populated using multiple sources of data. 
Prior information on the relationship between the PIFs and the human-machine failure modes could be 
defined by using an existing HRA method (e.g., as illustrated in [21] using SPAR-H [22]) or other 
HRA databases (e.g., [23]–[27]). Prior information on the PIF prior probabilities could be assembled 
from a variety of published sources in cognitive science and HRA, or via formal expert elicitation with 
HRA experts. The SACADA data would be used as information to Bayesian update multiple 
parameters within the model, using a Bayesian updating approach [28]. 
 
There are several reasons to include this aspect in the framework. First, it allows the causal model to 
be populated with appropriate information from multiple sources, including data. It also enables the 
model to include variables and information which are unlikely to be represented in the data (e.g., 
control room environment). This also provides a way to address the reality that some factors will be 
over- (or under-) weighted in the training contexts (e.g., high task complexity). 
 
4.5 Human-machine task sequences 
 
The final aspect of the framework involves modeling the sequential aspects of human-machine 
activities associated with the response to a malfunction. This addresses the need to treat an HFE as the 
outcome of a process involving several sequential activities or tasks involving different 
macrocognitive functions. This notion that human failure involves a series of activities and that there 
is dependency between HFEs has been acknowledged in even the earliest HRA methods [29]. It is 
considered in depth in simulation-based methods which explicitly model sequences of activities or 
subtasks involved in PRA event (e.g., [7], [8], [30], [31]). This sequential and semi-temporal aspect of 
performance needs to be modeled explicitly in order to reflect the fact that that failure is a process, not 
a single event.   
 
SACADA provides the first opportunity to use data inform this process. This opportunity arises as a 
result of several coupled aspects of the data. The first aspect is the detailed consideration of TOEs at 
the level of macrocognitive tasks (rather than at the higher event level used in many HRA methods). 
The second is the alignment of these TOEs with responses to specific malfunctions (more akin to the 
event level in HRA), and the third is that the PIFs are collected at the TOE level. This provides new 
potential to transform the treatment of sequential and temporal aspects of the PIFs and the activities 
that comprise an HRA event. A mechanism for modeling this dependency would be through the use of 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks, which were first introduced in [12], [32], [33] and further expanded 
within the HUNTER framework [30], [31], [34]. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The SACADA database provides a unique opportunity to enhance the foundations of HRA. This work 
provides a new framework for enhancing the foundations of HRA by using SACADA data together 
with scientific information and new modeling approaches. The next steps of this work involve further 
developing each aspect of the proposed framework. The framework proposed in this work will enable 
a path toward an HRA vision that is both model-based and data-informed, enhancing the technical 
basis of HRA and enabling streamlined use of SACADA data as the volume and variety of SACADA 
data increases. 
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Abstract
In this paper we define a methodology for using a multiple types of data to advance the field of Human Reliability Analysis
(HRA). The methodology uses causal models built from and parameterized by a combination of cognitive literature, existing HRA
methods, simulator data, and expert elicitation. The main elements of the framework include a comprehensive set of performance
influencing factors, human-machine failure modes, Bayesian Network causal models, and Bayesian parameter updating. The
methodology enhances both the qualitative and the quantitative basis of HRA, adding significant scientific depth and technical
traceability to the highly complicated problem of modeling human-machine performance in complex systems.
Keywords: Bayesian networks, human reliability analysis, macro cognitive function, HRA data, Bayesian updating
1. Introduction
The need for data-informed and traceable models which en-
able risk-informed decision making is one of the main chal-
lenges in the field of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).1 In
this regard, several international organizations are pursing data
collection through comprehensive control room simulator stud-
ies. SACADA [2], OPERA [3], and HURAM+ [4] are among
several HRA databases developed from nuclear power plant
(NPP) control room simulator studies conducted under the aus-
pices of the U.S. NRC, international research organizations, and
partner utilities, which provide a framework for HRA data col-
lection, analysis and exchange. SACADA is continuously being
used to generate new data while the formerly produced data is
being thoroughly analyzed for developing and optimizing the
use of SACADA [5].
As these databases become more mature, an important re-
search question emerges: how can this data be used to improve
HRA? As the first step towards answering this question, we ex-
plore how to use multiple elements of this simulator data to-
gether with causal models to enhance HRA.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the approach to development of the framework.
SACADA data structures and its embedded features are de-
scribed in Section 3 of this paper while Section 4 discusses
further elements of the framework. The algorithm used for de-
veloping this framework is explained systematically in Section
5. Finally, this paper ends with summary and conclusions in
Section 6.
Email addresses: kgroth@umd.edu (Katrina M. Groth),
smithrc@umd.edu (Reuel Smith), raminmrd@umd.edu (Ramin Moradi)
1This paper is significantly extended version of a paper presented at PSAM
14 [1]
2. Approach to the Development of the Framework
After initial familiarization with the available data, the first
step was to consider the desirable factors of the framework for
using this data to enhance HRA. The approach to development
of the proposed method was based on the desirable characteris-
tics of advanced HRA methods outlined by many HRA studies
(e.g., [6]). In particular, it was decided that during the first stage
of this work, the method should meet the following criteria:
1. The proposed method should be based on a causal model
of human-machine performance.2
2. The structure of the model should provide explicit repre-
sentation of the causal factors that affect human-machine
performance based on both cognitive science and systems
science.
3. The method should support the quantitative and qualitative
aspects of HRA as a part of probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA), including quantification of HEPs.
4. The method should provide a framework that is both data-
informed and model-informed.
5. The method should be flexible enough to accommodate
changes in database structure
6. The method should be able to incorporate additional data,
models, and information to address contexts or factors that
are not represented in the simulator data sources
7. The framework should be capable of providing quantita-
tive insights that can be used to help the data collection
teams improve human performance (e.g., via training).
2We use the term “human-machine performance” to emphasize that there
is an important role of both machines and humans in the concept of human
reliability.
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3. Description of SACADA Data
3.1. Database Structure
Chang et. al [2] has described the SACADA data taxon-
omy thoroughly. The current state of development is also de-
scribed in Chang and Franklin [5]. SACADA data consists of
recorded data about multiple facets of crew and system (ma-
chine) performance in NPP control rooms. A detailed structure
for collecting information about the plant conditions, the char-
acteristics of a simulator scenario, a task-level classification of
activities involved in responding to conditions in those scenar-
ios, crew roles, and the performance outcome (aggregated at
the task-level) for multiple crews that have performed the sce-
nario is provided by SACADA. SACADA provides a common
set of elements for capturing the context of the scenario (which
is generally the same across all crews), and a set of performance
factors that are used for debriefing crews when performance is
considered less-than-satisfactory.3
These scenarios are designed before the crews are run on the
scenario, and multiple crews run each scenario. Each scenario
begins at a plant initial condition and contains one or more plant
malfunctions that are purposefully programmed to occur dur-
ing the exercise. Each scenario has a correct response that can
be decomposed into a series of tasks or training objective el-
ements (TOE), each of which represents one activity that the
crews must complete to respond to the specified plant condition
or malfunction. Each TOE is associated with one of five macro
cognitive functions: monitoring/detecting; diagnosis; response
planning/decision making; manipulation/execution; and com-
munication/coordination.4 Example TOEs include things like
“ensure the charging cooling pump 1A is in service,” “announce
transition to procedure [number]” and “monitor [system X] and
identify increasing trend in pressure.” From an HRA perspec-
tive, these TOEs resemble tasks or sub-tasks. Many HRA meth-
ods are designed to be used at the scenario or event level, and
thus would include multiple TOEs.
The data collection team characterizes the context of each
scenario using situational factors (SFs) (which are similar to the
HRA concepts of PIFs), for each TOE. The SFs document the
context of each TOE, and they remain the same no matter which
crew is running the scenario. In SACADA, There are approxi-
mately 29 SFs in SACADA. Some of these factors are rated as
one of two states (present/absent), some have up to four states,
and some represent a summation of multiple constituent factors
rated on the two point (present/absent) scale, as described in
Chang et. al [2]. A subset of these SFs are assessed for each
TOE, and which subset is assessed is defined by the type of
Macro Cognitive function associated with the TOE.
3Satisfactory performance is defined from a training perspective. Use of
this data for HRA purposes requires some additional considerations, which are
described later in this paper.
4In SACADA, this is defined as “external communication,” meaning com-
munication beyond the crew or team. It is worth noting that this may be a
narrower interpretation of the macro cognitive concept of “communication,”
which also involves the concept of teamwork and within-team communication.
The outcome of the crew performance for each TOE is
ranked on a four-point scale (ordered from best to worst per-
formance, where “SAT” is an abbreviation of the word satisfac-
tory) [2]:
• SAT+: Outstanding crew performance
• SAT: Satisfactory crew performance that meets perfor-
mance requirements
• SAT∆: Unsatisfactory crew performance where perfor-
mance requirements are met but with deficiencies
• UNSAT: Unsatisfactory crew performance where perfor-
mance requirements are not met
When a crew receives a score of SAT∆ or UNSAT, to cap-
ture the causes of a degraded performance a second worksheet
is completed. The worksheet contains approximately 21 per-
formance factors (PFs) that are also similar to PIFs. As with
SFs, only a subset of the PFs are used depending on which
macro cognitive functions are involved. Several of the PF fac-
tors are rated as being in one of two states (present/absent),
some have up to six states, and some represent a summation
of multiple factors rated on the two point (present/absent) scale
as described in [2]. These PFs are used to describe the reasons
for errors (or near misses) for the crew on a specific TOE.
3.2. Current Data
This section provides summary information about the current
SACADA data set provided for descriptive purposes. Because
of the causal nature of the underlying factors, the author cau-
tions that no statistics of conclusions about HRA or human
performance should be drawn from these descriptive data,
because they are aggregated across contexts and because
not all combinations of contexts are represented in the cur-
rent data. Some contexts may be over- or under-represented in
the training data when compared to the contexts experienced in
real operational events.
As of July 2017, SACADA contains data from 86 simula-
tor scenarios with results coming from both published interna-
tional simulator experiments and non-published operator train-
ing activities. Within these 86 scenarios, there are 329 mal-
functions and a total of 2,155 TOEs. Each scenario was per-
formed by several crews, and on average each TOE was per-
formed by 12 crews. In total, the current SACADA database
contains 26,153 crew-TOEs (this number represents the sum-
product of the 2,155 TOEs and the variable number of crews
that attempted each TOE). Of the 2,155 TOEs, 149 TOEs had
one or more crews with a rating of UNSAT and 219 TOEs with
a rating of SAT∆. Of the 26,153 crew-TOE data points, there
were 209 scores of UNSAT and 261 scores of SAT∆.
4. Elements of the framework
The main elements of the proposed framework were defined
in the conference paper by Groth [1] (including a comprehen-
sive set of PIFs, human failure modes, Bayesian Network causal
models, Bayesian parameter updating, and temporal evolution
of performance) are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The main elements of the proposed framework for using SACADA
to enhance HRA.
4.1. A comprehensive set of PIFs
The first element in the proposed framework is a comprehen-
sive taxonomy of PIFs, such as the one from Groth and Mosleh
[7]. The taxonomy provides a consistent vocabulary and struc-
ture for combining data and information from multiple sources
and at multiple levels of detail in a transparent and repeatable
way. The taxonomy also provides non-overlapping, orthogonal
set of causal factors, meaning that each PIF is defined uniquely.
The term “orthogonal” is used to indicate that, while the factors
are uniquely defined, they may not be independent in a statisti-
cal or causal sense.
The data elements from SACADA and other databases would
be mapped onto this taxonomy. The use of such a taxonomy is
important because it provides a comprehensive list of PIFs and
clear definitions. By contrast, PIFs collected in most HRA data
sources are limited to the PIFs that can be observed or collected
in that performance context.
4.2. A set of human-machine team failure modes
This aspect of the framework involves having a defined set
of failure modes for the human-machine team. These capture
the ways that the human-machine teams could fail in respond-
ing to a condition or malfunction. The term “human-machine
failure mode” is designed to reflect that the HRA concept of a
human failure event (HFE) involves a contribution from both
the human response and the machine response. The definition
of these human-machine team failures modes could be achieved
via multiple approaches. One option is to use the failure modes
or failure-mode-identification approaches defined by the exist-
ing HRA methods, which acknowledge both a cognitive and
a machine element (e.g., methods such as IDA [8], IDAC [9],
IDHEAS [10], or PHOENIX [11, 12] and HRA research activi-
ties [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]). In this paper, we define one failure
mode for each of the five macro cognitive functions defined
in [18, 19]: (1) detecting and noticing, (2) understanding and
sense-making, (3) decision-making, (4) action, and (5) team-
work. In Whaley, for each macro cognitive function, the team
identified proximate causes for why the cognitive function may
fail, cognitive mechanisms underlying the failures, and factors
that influence the cognitive mechanisms and may lead to human
performance errors[18, 19].
Another option is to use first-principles reliability techniques
(e.g. by doing a “human-machine” FMEA with consideration
of macro cognitive functions and machine functions).
4.3. Bayesian Network (BN) causal models
In the proposed framework, BN causal models are used to
capture the detailed causal pathways and interdependencies
among PIFs. In this framework, BNs are used because of their
ability to model cause-and-effect relationships and the use of
probabilistic inference. Furthermore, BNs provide the ability
to reason about any variable in the model, enabling quantitative
insights relevant to improving performance.
This approach will allow all relevant PIFs (both observable
and unobservable) to be used in model development. In addi-
tion, it enables the explicit inclusion of data collection elements
within the model structure, and these data collection elements
could enable using data from different versions of SACADA.
These causal relationships would be initially developed from
cognitive science and systems science, and could eventually be
developed or validated by using SACADA data. The BN model
will be developed by creating an explicit map between PIFs
(first element described above) and the human-machine team
failure modes (second element described above). This is ac-
complished by using the causal mapping approach developed
and illustrated in [20]. The starting point for development of
this causal mapping has been developed as part of NRCs work
on defining a cognitive basis for HRA [18, 19] and in the IDAC
model [21]. The size of the resulting BN models could be re-
duced (e.g., to facilitate quantification) by using node reduction
algorithms [20]. A second approach would be to follow the ap-
proach of [22] and use factor analysis clustering, or structure
learning algorithms techniques directly on the SACADA data.
4.4. Data and Bayesian parameter updating
The quantitative parameters of the BN models would be pop-
ulated using multiple sources of data. Prior information on
the relationship between the PIFs and the human-machine fail-
ure modes could be defined by using an existing HRA method
(e.g., as illustrated in [23] using SPAR-H [24]) or other HRA
databases (e.g., [3, 4, 25, 26, 27]). Prior information on the
PIF prior probabilities could be assembled from a variety of
published sources in cognitive science and HRA, or via for-
mal expert elicitation with HRA experts such as in [27]. The
SACADA data would be used as information to Bayesian up-
date multiple parameters within the model, using a Bayesian
updating approach [28].
There are several reasons to include this aspect in the frame-




Figure 2: Block diagram depicting the algorithm that executes the steps outlined in the original framework.
appropriate information from multiple sources, including data.
It also enables the model to include variables and information
which are unlikely to be represented in the data (e.g., control
room environment). This also provides a way to address the re-
ality that some factors will be over- (or under-) weighted in the
training contexts (e.g., high task complexity).
4.5. Human-machine task sequences
The final aspect as well as the next step of the framework in-
volves modeling the sequential aspects of human-machine ac-
tivities associated with the response to a malfunction. This ad-
dresses the need to treat an HFE as the outcome of a process
involving several sequential activities or tasks involving differ-
ent macro cognitive functions. This notion that human failure
involves a series of activities and that there is dependency be-
tween HFEs has been acknowledged in even the earliest HRA
methods [29]. It is considered in depth in simulation-based
methods which explicitly model sequences of activities or sub-
tasks involved in PRA event (e.g., [8, 9, 30, 31, 32]). This se-
quential and semi-temporal aspect of performance needs to be
modeled explicitly in order to reflect the fact that that failure is
a process, not a single event.
SACADA provides the first opportunity to use data inform
this process. This opportunity arises as a result of several cou-
pled aspects of the data. The first aspect is the detailed consid-
eration of TOEs at the level of macro cognitive tasks (rather
than at the higher event level used in many HRA methods).
The second is the alignment of these TOEs with responses to
specific malfunctions (more akin to the event level in HRA),
and the third is that the PIFs are collected at the TOE level.
This provides new potential to transform the treatment of se-
quential and temporal aspects of the PIFs and the activities that
comprise an HRA event. A mechanism for modeling this de-
pendency would be through the use of Dynamic Bayesian Net-
works, which were introduced in [33, 14, 34], and further ex-
panded within the HUNTER framework [30, 31, 32].
5. Overview of Algorithm
A simplified outline of the algorithm is presented in Figure
2. At a high-level, the algorithm involves four main activities:
causal factor mapping (BN structure development), prior model
quantification (parameterization of the BN), Bayesian updating
of the model parameters, and use of the BN for HRA activities.
The algorithm includes the following steps:
• Block 1: Causal Factor Mapping (BN structure develop-
ment)
– Create a causal map of the relationship between the
PIFs, failure mechanisms, proximate causes of fail-
ure, and MCFs.
– Simplify BN structure using node reduction
• Block 2: Prior model quantification (BN parameterization)
– Map existing HRA method PIFs to PIF taxonomy
(see Table 1)
– Use existing HRA method to get priors of the proba-
bility of MCF error Pr(MCFerror|PIFs)
– Expert elicit priors for PIFs, Pr(PIFs)
• Block 3: Bayesian update model parameters
– Map simulation data source variables to PIFs
– Use simulation data source to update probability of
MCF error Pr(MCFerror|PIFs)
– (Optional) Perform Bayesian update of the PIF prob-
abilities Pr(PIFs)
• Block 4: Use the BN for HRA activities.
This algorithm uses an existing HRA method and expert elic-
itation as the basis for determining the priors parameters for the
quantitative model. Similarly, the algorithm then uses the sim-
ulator data source as the data used to update the model.
5.1. Block 1: Causal Factor Mapping
Block 1 entails developing a full mapping of the causal fac-
tors which are relevant to modeling human failure events.
This step of the algorithm draws a graphical model between
several specific elements: the failure of an MCF (which is sim-
ilar to the concept of a failure mode in PRA), the proximate
causes of failure (PC), the failure mechanisms (FM), and the
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Table 1: Proposed PIF taxonomy for use in HRA data collection and causal models [7].
Organization-based Team-based Person-based Situation/ stressor-based Machine-based
Training program Communication Attention External environment HSI
Availability Availability To task Conditioning events Input
Quality Quality To surroundings Task load Output
Corrective action program Direct supervision Physical & psychological abilities Time load System response
Availability Leadership Alertness Other loads
Quality Team coordination Fatigue Non-task
Other programs Team cohesion Impairment Passive information
Availability Role awareness Sensory limits Task complexity
Quality Physical attributes Cognitive
Safety culture Other Execution
Management activities Knowledge/ experience Stress
Staffing Skills Perceived situation
Scheduling Bias Severity
Workplace adequacy Familiarity with situation Urgency










Figure 3: General structure of a Bayesian Network consisting of a causal
structure linking PIFs (green) directly to PIFs and to failure mechanisms (FM)
(blue), which are directly linked to proximate causes of failure (PC) (orange),
which directly link to a macro cognitive function (MCF) (yellow). The MCFs
could furthermore be directly linked to a node, defining the probability of an
HFE.
associated PIFs 5. Figure 3 illustrates the form of these rela-
tionships as the directed acyclic graph portion of a Bayesian
Network (BN; also called Bayesian Belief Network, BBN).
In general, the PIF nodes will be discretized into a
small number states of the PIF (e.g., high/medium/low, ade-
quate/inadequate). The FMs and PCs will be binary nodes with
states (true/false) The MCF node could be a binary (true/false)
node, or could be a value node representing the probability of a
5Note that the terminology of PCs and FMs used in this paper is chosen to
be consistent with [19]. If PCs are not used, one could directly link FMs to the
failure of MCFs
failure of the MCF.
Whaley et. al. conducted an extensive literature review
which defined five MCFs: (1) detecting and noticing, (2) under-
standing and sense making, (3) decision making, (4) action, and
(5) team coordination [18, 19]. The Whaley work also devel-
oped associated proximate causes of failure (PC), failure mech-
anisms (FM), for each MCF based on published cognitive lit-
erature. The relationships between MCF, PCs, and FMs should
be directly captured in the causal model. In addition, the rela-
tionship between FMs and PIFs, and between PIFs, must also
be captured explicitly within the model.6
The target node of the BN is the failure of an MCF; this is
characterized as the probability of an MCF failure conditional
on the state of its parent notes Pr(MCFerror|parents). The
next layer of the model, the parents of MCFerror, indicates that
failure of an MCF can be caused by one or several different
proximate causes of failure; this causal relationship is directly
mapped from [18, 19]. Similarly, each proximate cause of fail-
ure is a result of a set of failure mechanisms, as indicated in
[18, 19].
The final layer of the model is the set of PIFs which causally
influence the occurrence of the failure mechanisms. This layer
of the model includes causal arcs from PIFs to FMs, and causal
arcs which capture interdependence between PIFs. These re-
lationships are partially discussed in the Whaley work, but are
incomplete since the focus of the Whaley et al. work was to
identify PIFs relevant to FM rather than to create a model of the
PIFs and FMs. Identification of the interdependencies among
the PIFs and the relationship between FMs and sets of PIFs re-
quires going to the original cognitive literature cited in Whaley.
6These relationships are partially discussed in [19], but are incomplete in
[19] since the focus of the work in [19] was to identify PIFs relevant to each
FM rather than to create a model of the PIFs and FMs. Identification of the
interdependencies among the PIFs and the relationship between FMs and sets
of PIFs requires going to the original cognitive literature cited in [19].
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Figure 4: The Bayesian network characterizing the relationship between three
different types of loads defined by Groth and Mosleh [7].
Thus, there are several aspects involved in developing this final
layer.
The first step is to conduct direct causal mapping of PIF and
FM relationships, which can be extracted from cognitive liter-
ature. The work by [20] illustrates the approach for directly
mapping the causal relationships and causal pathways which
are present in cognitive literature, conducted by reviewing the
PIFs identified by Whaley for each FM, and furthermore re-
viewing each literature source cited in [18, 19].
The second step involves capturing causal relationships be-
tween PIFs at different levels of detail or depth within the hi-
erarchy. Several PIF nodes as defined by Whaley [18, 19] re-
quire some expansion to capture specific aspects of the PIF. For
example, Whaley [18, 19] uses the PIF “Load” which could re-
fer to several different types of loads. Following the Groth and
Mosleh PIF taxonomy [7], the concept of “Load” would be rep-
resented as the BN outlined in Figure 4. This two step process
can be followed to fully expand the outer layers of the BN for
each MCF.
Once the full causal structure is developed for an MCF, the
next step is to conduct node reduction to simplify the BN struc-
ture for easier quantification. To do this, we apply a node re-
duction an algorithm designed by Shachter [35] as described by
[20]. The algorithm allows for simplification of the BN struc-
ture in such a way that the dependence and independence as-
sumptions are not changed [36]. The three rules of the node
reduction algorithm are the following:
• Two nodes Z1 and Z2 may have their link (or arc) directions
reversed if node Z1 has the same parents as Z2 and if the
reversal doesn’t cause the BN to become cyclical.
• Nodes without child nodes or evidence are referred to as
barren nodes and can therefore be removed from the BN
without changing the overall BN logic.
• A chance node may be removed if it precedes a value node
of interest and only a value node of interest; the value node
inherits the conditional predecessors of the removed node.
Figure 5: An example of node reduction on the BN for “Expectation
Mismatch between expected and actual cues.” [18, 19] By node reduction of
the top BN, the bottom BN may be attained.
Figure 5 presents a very simple example of causal mapping
and subsequent node reduction using one of the failure mech-
anisms: “Expectation Mismatch between expected and actual
cues.” This failure mechanism describes a scenario where a
plant operator does not detect a particular cue (i.e., an indicator
state) because that the operator is expecting to see a different
cue.
The PIFs identified for this FM in [18, 19], are HSI, training
program, and knowledge and experience. Each of these directly
or indirectly influences the FM. Further review of the literature
cited in [18, 19] illustrates an important additional PIF, bias,
and a causal relationship between this bias and the other PIFs
identified by Whaley. This causal relationship among PIFs is
identified by [37] who noted that an operator is able to visu-
ally scan a panel more quickly if they have seen it before (e.g.
training program and knowledge and experience). This indi-
cates that both the operator knowledge and experience and the
training supports the development mental models (biases) of
indicator configuration. A further causal relationship is found
in the work of Nikolic et. al. [38], who noted that the expec-
tation (a type of bias) of a particular indicator signal will affect
the likelihood that the signal will get the operators attention.
This expectation is due to the operators knowledge or experi-
ence of panel signals and due to the configuration of the display
6
Draft
(the HSI). This source is used to create the direct link from bias
to the FM, and further supports the links from knowledge and
experience and HSI to bias.
The relationship between HSI Input, HSI Output, and the HSI
node and similar relationships with parents of Training are di-
rected based on the the decomposition of these PIFs into addi-
tional levels of detail as illustrated in the PIF hierarchy (Table
1).
A next step in the process would be to perform a similar cog-
nitive literature review and mapping to establish the outer layers
of the BN for the other FMs in the model; for brevity this is not
illustrated in this paper.
To apply node reduction to this structure, one can first reverse
the direction of several of the node links one by one. Revers-
ing the link from bias to knowledge and experience leaves the
knowledge and experience node barren, and thus it can be re-
moved, as illustrated in Figure 5. We could apply further node
reduction to remove the HSI Input, HSI Output, Availability and
Quality, fully absorbing these nodes into the “typical” PIFs of
HSI and training. However, we could also choose to stop at this
level because these relationships are straightforward to quantify
(see Block 2).
The resulting node-reduced BN would then be used as a sim-
plified structure to be quantified in Block 2.
5.2. Block 2: Prior model quantification (BN parameteriza-
tion)
Block 2 of the algorithm involves assignment of the prior
values for the conditional and marginal probabilities of all the
nodes in the BN structured we defined in Block 1. These prior
probabilities represent the probabilities prior to being Bayesian
updated using HRA data.
In a BN, all nodes, Zi, are specified by a conditional proba-
bility distribution given their parents, Pr(Zi|pa(Zi)). For nodes
without parents, this reduces to the marginal distribution Pr(Zi).
We restrict ourselves to BNs with discrete random variables,
which are described by their conditional probability mass func-
tion (PMF), which are summarized in conditional probability
tables (CPTs).
The BN factorizes the joint probability of all of the nodes





In the BN structure defined in Block 1, we have six different




Pr(PC j|pa(PC j)) (4)
Pr(MCFi|pa(MCFi)) (5)
Pr(HFE|MCFs) (6)
where pa(PIF) and pa(FM) are a subset of the PIFs, pa(PC)
are a subset of the FMs, pa(MCF) are all PCs defined for that
MCF, and pa(HFE) are all of the MCFs.
Equation 1 requires information about the (marginal) proba-
bilities of the root node PIFs. The prior probabilities for these
nodes can be directly obtained by expert elicitation, e.g., as in
[39].
Equation 2 denotes the probabilities of PIFs which have par-
ent nodes; in this case the parents are other PIFs. These rela-
tionships can also be directly obtained by expert elicitation. In
addition, these relationships could be quantified simply using
an OR or a Noisy-OR relationship.
Equations 3, 4, 5, 6 may be quantified in one of several ways
depending on the availability of prior information. Option 1
assumes that there is relevant existing HRA information that
can be used to quantify the relationships between PCs, FMs,
and MCFs. Options 2, 3, and 4 assume that this information
does not exist.
Option 1. Expert elicitation or cognitive-based HRA
methods. It is possible to directly expert elicit the priors that
define the arcs from PIFs to FMs, from FMs to PCs, and from
PCs to MCFs, and from MCFs to HFEs. A better option is to
leverage the probabilities from the two existing HRA methods
which use the concepts of FMs, PCs, and MCFs: PHOENIX
[12] and IDHEAS [10], or via the cognitively focused HRA
method ATHEANA [40]. These methods would need to be aug-
mented with additional expert elicitation to account for multiple
PIFs which were not included in either PHOENIX or IDHEAs,
and to account for a small number of FMs and PCs which were
omitted from one or both methods.
Option 2. OR Logic, or a deterministic probability assign-
ment, can be used to efficiently and quickly define the relation-
ships between a set of parent nodes Zi=1, · · · ,Zi=n and a child
node X via a truth table composed of 0s and 1s. Essentially,
if any parent is true, the probability of the target state of the
child node is 1. For example, if a FM1 occurs, its child PC1
would also occur. This logic provides a logarithmic reduction
in the number of parameters which must be specified. This de-
terministic relationship is readily justifiable for the relationship
between FMs and PCs, between PCs and MCFs, and between
MCFs and HFE because of the way these concepts were defined
in [19]. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the way
that these relationships are quantified in both PHOENIX and
IDHEAS.
Option 3. NOISY-OR logic. offers a similar conditional
gate called a noisy-OR gate [41, 42], which has also been ex-
tended to multi-state nodes. A noisy-OR gate is an extension
of an OR-gate that relates a set of parent nodes Z
′
i=1, · · · ,Z
′
i=n
to a child node X. The noisy-OR gate is further defined by
an inhibitor (or node suppression) probability qi for each node
Zi. Quantification of a noisy-OR gate is governed by a strict
true/false scenario for the output node where the probability of
the child node being true (X = 1) given that a single parent is
true is 1 − qz; for multi-parent nodes this becomes 1 − qti where
t denotes the number of parents in a true state.
For example, With respect to the conditional PMFs for PC j,













As with option 2, this approach can be readily justified for
the FM to PC, PC to MCF, and MCF to HFE relationships. This
approach also provides additional potential for quantifying PIF
to FM relationships.
Option 4. Additional node reduction can be performed
to further simplify the BN structure for quantification beyond
what was demonstrated in 5. In Figure 3 we applied reduction
to only the PIF nodes. However, we can further reduce the full
conceptual BN model (Figure 3) by applying the third rule of
node reduction stating that a chance node may be removed if it
precedes a value node of interest and only a value node of inter-
est. In this case, we would implement the MCF node as a value
node, and as such all of the PC nodes may be removed based on
this rule. The FM nodes may also be removed by application
of this same node reduction rule. This reduces the general BN
structure to a much simplified structure outlined in Figure 6 that
only consists of PIF nodes and the MCF node of interest. The
relationship between MCF and HFE would be additive.
Clearly, this node-reduced structure directly resembles the
vast majority of HRA methods in that it directly relates the PIFs
to specific types of human errors.
Figure 6: Simplified structure of a Bayesian Network based on a complete
node reduction the full BN (Figure 3) that removes all FM and PC nodes. The
simplified BN consists only of the series of NPIF PIFs and a macro cognitive
function error (MCF).
With this node quantification, the remaining relationships
(i.e., the PIF to MCF relationships) can be quantified in a
straightforward manner by using an existing HRA method.
Several options for an existing HRA exist including CREAM
[43], CBDT [44], THERP [29], HEART [45], and SPAR-H
[24]. A second option is to define priors directly from exist-
ing HRA databases (e.g. [3, 4, 24, 25, 26, 27]).
To do this, the PIFs of an existing HRA method or HRA data
source would be mapped onto the same PIF taxonomy used in
the previous step. Table 2 presents an example of this mapping
where the PIFs of the SPAR-H HRA method ((1) available time,
(2) stress/stressors, (3) complexity, (4) experience and training,
(5) procedures, (6) ergonomics/HMI, (7) fitness for duty, and
(8) work processes) are matched with the PIFs from the pro-
posed PIF taxonomy (Table 1). Since many existing HRAs are
made up of a limited number of PIFs, this mapping procedure
may need to be augmented with expert information. For exam-
ple, bias is a PIF whose description does not readily match any
of the PIFs listed under SPAR-H [7]. Thorough revision of sup-
plementary HRAs is necessary to find matches for all PIFs of a
full taxonomy.
Table 2: The eight SPAR-H PIFs [24] as they match with the full PIF
taxonomy as defined by Groth and Mosleh [7].
SPAR-H PIF Full PIF Taxonomy Equivalent(s) [7]





































Upon completion of the PIF mapping step, the MCF er-
ror conditional on the PIFs Pr(MCF|PIF1, PIF2, . . . , PIFnPIF )
(where MCF = 1 if there is error and MCF = 0 if there is no
error), is quantified directly by application of the HRA method,
as illustrated in [23].
5.3. Block 3: Bayesian update model parameters
The third block of the algorithm involves performing
Bayesian updating on all of the probability nodes in the BN.
Using a Bayesian updating process allows us to incorporate
multiple sources of data in the assignment of probabilities.
The Bayesian updating process for HRA methods has been de-
scribed by [28].
As stated in Section 4.4, there are several possible data
sources which could be used in this algorithm. The first task
in implementing the data is to first map the data variables and
8
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states (i.e., the PIFs, SFs, and causal factors) to the PIFs that
are defined in the selected taxonomy; this step is similar to
the mapping performed for prior data sources in Block 2. In
SACADA, the SFs have multiple states which together charac-
terize the scenario context. Appendix A provides a complete
example of mapping the SACADA SF states to the PIF taxon-
omy in Table 1 based on the detailed variable definitions pro-
vided by both original sources.
As with all mapping procedures in this algorithm, the data
source-to-PIF mapping requires a careful consideration of
which PIFs are captured by the variables used in the data source.
For example, Appendix A Table A.3 cites three SACADA states
under the workload significant factor (normal, concurrent de-
mands, and multiple concurrent demands). All states fall un-
der the task load PIF by definition, however the characteristics
would be of lower to higher load in the given state order. Addi-
tionally, the multiple concurrent demands state would be given
an additional PIF stress due to the increased demands on the op-
erator. Therefore it is important to clarify any and all ambiguity
in the definitions of the data states before mapping begins. Sev-
eral revisions and reviews may be necessary to build a map that
accurately accounts for the range of PIFs that may be associated
with the data.
After mapping is concluded, the next step in this block
of the algorithm is to use the simulation source data D
to update prior values placed on the probabilistic relation-
ships defined in Equations (1-6) in Block 2. For example,
SACADA can be used to update probability of MCF error
Pr(MCF|D, PIF1, PIF2, . . . , PIFnPIF ), and in some cases may
be used to update the interdependencies between specific PIFs.
Note that SACADA provides joint probabilities of multiple
PIFs and outcomes; translating this into CPTs can be obtained
by applying the definition of conditional probability.
The process in Block 3 would be repeated for each data
source. If the BN is implemented in software such as GeNiE
[46] or the Bayes Net Toolbox [47, 48], then this step can be
facilitated substantially.
5.4. Block 4: Use the BN for HRA activities
The fourth and final block indicates that the use of the BN
is a separate concept from the development of the BN therein.
Using the BN for HRA activities would proceed similarly to
existing uses of BNS, such as those described in the review by
Mkrtchyan et al. [49].
6. Conclusion
The algorithm presented in this paper provides the first com-
prehensive methodology for fusing cognitive literature, exist-
ing HRA models, and HRA data from multiple sources. The
algorithm enhances both the qualitative and quantitative basis
of the field of HRA. We demonstrated how to combine exist-
ing HRA models with a causal understanding of failure (that is,
cognitive information akin to “physics of failure” information
regarding human/machine teams) in order to deal with inherent
data limitations. The combination requires a complex data fu-
sion procedure and the design of a BN structure which defines
the relationship between PIFs, FMs, PCs, and MCFs; which
have both been defined in this paper by way of a complex BN
node quantification method. This adds credibility and trace-
ability to the HRA models and thus makes them more useful
in a NPP situation. The second finding is the newfound poten-
tial that the SACADA database has as a useful source of HRA
data and as a means of providing a temporal evolution of hu-
man error and PIFs. States defined by the SACADA database
can be readily mapped to HRA PIFs and PIF characteristic
based on a complete taxonomy of PIFs. This in addition to
the quality of the SACADA database makes probabilities such
as Pr(FM|PIF1, PIF2, · · · , PIFnPIF ) readily quantifiable which
aids in the implementation of the algorithm described in this
paper. The framework and HRA modeling algorithm proposed
in this work will enable a path toward an HRA vision that is
both model-based and data-informed, enhancing the technical
basis of HRA and enabling streamlined use of HRA databases
as the volume and variety of HRA data increases.
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Appendix A. SACADA-to-PIF Mapping
This appendix outlines the results of a preliminary mapping
of the SACADA states to the PIFs states for use in the algo-
rithm. The detailed taxonomy and definitions of the SACADA
states is given in Chang et. al. [2] while the PIF taxonomy is
given by Groth and Mosleh [7]. Each PIF is given a character-
istic in terms of its relationship to one of the discrete states of
the PIF (e.g., good/nominal/poor/bad, high/medium/low, or not
applicable. In [2], the situational factors are associated with
different macrocognitive functions, and a set of overarching
factors which affect the performance of control room operators
in all macrocognitive functions. The mapping for Overarching
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factors is presented in Table A.3. The mapping for Monitoring
and Detecting is separated into Table A.4 for alarm detection
and monitoring, and Table A.5 for indicator detection and mon-
itoring. The mapping for Understanding and Diagnosis is pre-
sented in Table A.6. The tables for Response Planning and for
Manipulation are presented in Table A.7 and Table A.8 respec-
tively. The SFs for communication are presented in Table A.9.
In some cases, SACADA SFs were irrelevant to determining
PIFs; these are indicated by N/A.
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Table A.3: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “Overarching factors” onto the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Workload Normal Task Load Low
Concurrent Demands Task Load High
Multiple Concurrent Demands Task Load High
Stress High
Time Criticality Expansive Time Available Time Load Low
Perceived Situation Urgency Low
Nominal Time Available Task Load Low
Barely Adequate Time Available Time Load High
Perceived Situation Urgency High
Extent of Communications Required Nominal Communication Communication Availability High
Loads Non-task High
Extensive Onsite Communication Communication Availability High
Loads Non-task High
Extensive Communication Within the Control Room Communication Availability High
Loads Non-task High
Other Demands/Factors Non-Standard Other Loads High
Noisy Background External Environment High
Coordination Loads Non-task High
Communicator Unavailable Communication Availability High
Multiple Demands Task Load High
Memory Demands Task Load High
Table A.4: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “detecting an alarm” onto the the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Detection Mode Self-Revealing HSI Output Good
Procedure Directed Check Procedures Availability Good
Task Complexity Cognitive Good
Procedure Directed Monitoring Procedures Availability Good
Task Complexity Cognitive Good
Awareness/ Inspection Task Complexity Cognitive Medium
Status of Alarm Board Dark Loads Passive information Good
Busy Loads Passive information Normal
Overloaded Loads Passive information Bad
Task Complexity Bad
Expectation of Alarm/Indication Change Expected System Response Good
Not Expected System Response Bad
Table A.5: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “detecting or monitoring an indicator” onto the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Detection Mode Procedure Directed Check Procedures Availability Good
Task Complexity Cognitive Good
Knowledge-Driven Monitoring Task Complexity Cognitive Medium
Procedure-Directed Monitoring Procedures Availability Good
Task Complexity Cognitive Good
Awareness/Inspection Task Complexity Cognitive Medium
Individual Indicator Slight Change HSI Output Poor/Bad
Distinct Change HSI Output Good
Mimics/Display etc. No Mimics HSI Output Poor
Small Indications HSI Output Bad
Similar Displays HSI Output Bad
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Table A.6: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “understanding or diagnosis” onto the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Diagnosis Basis Procedure Procedures Availability Good/Bad
Skill Procedures Availability Good/Bad
Skills Good/Bad
Knowledge Procedures Availability Good/Bad
Knowledge/Experience Good/Bad
Familiarity Standard Familiarity with Situation Good
Novel Familiarity with Situation Poor
Anomaly Procedures Quality Poor
Familiarity with Situation Bad
Outcome Procedure-Based Activity N/A
Skill-Based Behavior N/A
Knowledge-Based Behavior N/A
Information Integration Timing of Information Necessary Information Availability Poor
Ambiguous Information Necessary Information Quality Poor
Integration Required Necessary Information Quality Poor
Task Complexity Cognitive Poor
Diagnosis Information Specificity Specific Necessary Information Quality Good
Task Complexity Cognitive Good
Not Specific Necessary Information Quality Poor
Information Quality Missing Information Necessary Information Availability Poor
Misleading Information Necessary Information Quality Poor
Conflicting Information Necessary Information Quality Poor
Table A.7: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “response planning or decision making” onto the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Decision Basis Procedure Procedures Good/Bad
Skill Skills Good/Bad
Knowledge Knowledge/Experience Good/Bad
Familiarity Standard Familiarity with Situation Good
Adaptation Required Familiarity with Situation Bad
Anomaly Procedures Quality Poor
Familiarity with Situation Bad
Uncertainty Clear Procedures Quality Good
Necessary Information Quality Good
Uncertain Procedures Quality Poor
Necessary Information Quality Poor
Competing Priorities Attention to Task Poor
Attention to Surroundings Poor
Task Complexity High
Perceived Situation Urgency High
Conflicting Guidance Procedures Quality Poor
Communication Quality Poor
Direct Supervision Leadership Poor




Table A.8: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “manipulation” onto the PIF taxonomy defined.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Type of Action Simple and Distinct Task Complexity Execution Low
Order Task Complexity Execution Medium
Maintaining Task Complexity Execution Medium
Location Main or Auxiliary Control Board HSI Input Good
Back Control Panels HSI Input Bad
Guidance Procedure Task Complexity Execution Low
Skill of the Craft (Non-Faulted Hardware) Task Complexity Execution Low
STAR (Faulted Hardware) Task Complexity Execution Medium
Recoverability Immediately Recoverable System Response; Perceived Decision Impact Low
Recoverable With Significant Efforts System Response; Perceived Decision Impact High
Unrecoverable Conditioning Event; Perceived Decision Impact High
Additional Factors Unintuitive Plant Response System Response Bad
Unintuitive Controls HSI Input Bad
Additional Mental Effort Required Task Load; Task Complexity Bad
Inadequate Feedback Necessary Information (Availability, Quality) Bad
Similar Controls HSI Input Bad
Table A.9: Mapping of the SACADA SFs for “communication” onto the PIF taxonomy.
SF Subgroup SF State PIF PIF State
Communication Driver Specifically Procedure Directed Communication Availability High
Not Specifically Driven Communication Availability Low
Direction of Communication From Booth N/A
To Booth N/A





Appendix C: Tables and Figures 
Appendix C1. Table of Elicit Priors for PIFs 
The SyRRA group selected the following table based on a report by the NRC depicting a database of PIF probabilities 
under the SPAR-H methodology [5, 6].   
 Inadequate Barely Adequate Nominal Extra Expansive 
Available Time 1.00 × 10−6 0.159 0.683 0.136 0.023 
 Nominal High Extreme   
Stress/Stressors 0.841 0.136 0.023   
 Nominal Moderate High   
Complexity 0.5 0.341 0.159   
 Low Nominal High   
Experience and 
Training 0.333 0.333 0.333 
  
 Not Available Incomplete Available but poor Nominal 
 
Procedures 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.45  
 Missing/misleading Poor Nominal Good  
Ergonomics/HMI 0.023 0.136 0.683 0.159  
 Unfit Degraded Fitness Nominal 
  
Fitness for Duty 1.00 × 10−6 0.159 0.841   
 Poor Nominal Good   





Appendix C2. Figures Depicting Failure of Macro Cognitive Function Detection and Noticing 
The following models are based on the failure of macro cognitive function “Detecting and Noticing” as defined by 
Whaley et. al [8]. It is important to note that these models neglect interdependency among PIFs and must be revised 

































































































































































































































Appendix C3. PIF Taxonomy for Project 
The BBNs that the SyRRA group designed in Appendix C2 stick to the following PIF taxonomy defined by Groth 
and Mosleh [10]. 
 
Organization-based Team-based Person-based Situation/stressor-based Machine-based 
Training program Communication Attention External environment HSI 
Availability Availability To task Conditioning events Input 
Quality Quality To surroundings Task load Output 
Corrective action program Direct supervision Physical & psychological abilities Time load System response 
Availability Leadership Alertness Other loads 
 
Quality Team coordination Fatigue Non-task 
 
Other programs Team cohesion Impairment Passive information 
 



















































    
Necessary information 
    
Availability 
    
Quality 






Appendix C4. Example of SACADA State-to-PIF Mapping 
The following table shows the draft  of SACADA state-to-PIF and characteristic mapping for demonstration. 
SACADA Situational Factor SACADA States PSF (Groth, 2012) Characteristics   
   
Importance 
1:Other Perceived Situation Severity Perceived Situation Urgency 
NA 
NA 
2:Significant Perceived Situation Severity Perceived Situation Urgency 
NA 
NA 
3:Safety Significant Perceived Situation Severity Perceived Situation Urgency 
NA 
NA 
4:Critical Perceived Situation Severity Perceived Situation Urgency 
NA 
NA 
Cognitive Type 1:Monitoring/Detection N/A NA 
2:Diagnosis & Response 
Planning N/A NA 
3:Manipulation N/A NA 
4:External Communication N/A NA 
Monitoring/Detection Detection Type 1:Alarm HSI Output Good 
2:Status Tile HSI Output Good 
3:Meter HSI Output Good 
4:Indication Light HSI Output Good 
5:Flag HSI Output Good 
6:Computer HSI Output Good 
7:Other HSI Output Good 
Alarms/Status Tile Detection Mode 1:Self-Revealing HSI Output Good 





Resources Procedures Availability 
Resources Procedures Quality 
Good 
Good 
4:Awareness/Inspection Attention to Surroundings Good 
Status of Alarm Board 1:Dark Other Loads Passive information Normal 
2:Busy Other Loads Passive information Normal 






1:Expected System Response Good 
2:Not Expected System Response Bad 
3:Not Applicable N/A NA 
Meter/Light/Flag Detection Mode 




Monitoring Knowledge/Experience Good 
3:Procedure-Directed 
Monitoring 
Resources Procedures Availability 
Resources Procedures Quality 
Good 
Good 
4:Awareness/Inspection Attention to Surroundings Good 
Individual Indicator 1:Slight Change HSI Output Poor/Bad 
2:Distinct Change HSI Output Good 
Mimics/Display etc. 1:No Mimics HSI Output Poor 
2:Small Indications HSI Output Bad 
3:Similar Displays HSI Output Bad 





Diagnosis or Response 
Planning 
2:Primarily Response 
Planning/Decision Making N/A NA 
Diagnosis Diagnosis Basis 1:Procedure Resources Procedures Availability Good/Bad 
2:Skill Resources Procedures Availability Skills 
Good/Bad 
Good/Bad 
3:Knowledge Resources Procedures Availability Knowledge/Experience 
Good/Bad 
Good/Bad 
Familiarity 1:Standard Familiarity with Situation Good 
2:Novel Familiarity with Situation Good 
3:Anomaly Resources Procedures Quality Familiarity with Situation 
Poor 
Bad 
Outcome 1:Procedure-Based Activity Resources Procedures Good 
2:Skill-Based Behavior Skills Good 
3:Knowledge-Based Behavior Knowledge/Experience Good 
Information 
Integration 1:Timing of Information 
Resources Necessary Information 
Availability Poor 
2:Ambiguous Information Resources Necessary Information Quality Poor 
3:Integration Required 
Resources Necessary Information 
Quality 





Resources Necessary Information 
Quality 
Task Complexity Cognitive 
Good 
Poor 
2:Not Specific Resources Necessary Information Quality Poor 
3:Not Applicable N/A NA 
Information Quality 1:Missing Information Resources Necessary Information Availability Poor 
2:Misleading Information Resources Necessary Information Quality Poor 




Decision Basis 1:Procedure Resources: Procedures Good/Bad 
2:Skill Skills Good/Bad 
3:Knowledge Knowledge/Experience Good/Bad 
Familiarity 1:Standard Familiarity with Situation Good 
2:Adaptation Required Familiarity with Situation Bad 





Resources Procedures Quality 





Resources Procedures Quality 





Attention to Task 
Attention to Surroundings 
Task Complexity 






Resources Procedures Quality 
Communication Quality 




Outcome 1:Procedure-Based Activity Resources Procedures Good 
2:Skill-Based Behavior Skills Good 
3:Knowledge-Based Behavior Knowledge/Experience Good 
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Manipulation Type of Action 1:Simple and Distinct Task Complexity Execution Low 
2:Order Task Complexity Execution Medium 
3:Maintaining Task Complexity Execution High 
Location 1:Main or Auxiliary Control 
Board HSI Input Good 
2:Back Control Panels HSI Input Bad 
Guidance 1:Procedure Resources Procedures Good 
2:Skill of the Craft (Non-Faulted 
Hardware) Skills Good/Bad 
3:STAR (Faulted Hardware) Conditioning Events Bad 
Recoverability 
1:Immediately Recoverable System Response Perceived Decision Personal Impact 
Low 
Low 
2:Recoverable With Significant 
Efforts 
System Response 
Perceived Decision Personal Impact 
High 
High 
3:Unrecoverable Perceived Decision Personal Impact High 
Additional Factors 1:Unintuitive Plant Response System Response Bad 
2:Unintuitive Controls HSI Input Bad 
3:Additional Mental Effort 
Required Task Load Bad 
4:Inadequate Feedback 
Resources Necessary Information 
Availability 






5:Similar Controls HSI Input Bad 
Communication 
Between Crew and 
Simulator Booth 
Communication Driver 1:Specifically Procedure 
Directed Communication Quality Medium 
2:Not Specifically Driven Communication Quality Medium 
Direction of 
Communication 
1:From Booth Communication Quality Medium 
2:To Booth Communication Quality Medium 
3:Public Address Announcement Communication Quality Medium 
4:Other Communication Quality Medium 
Overarching Issues Workload 1:Normal Task Load Low 
2:Concurrent Demands Task Load High 




1:Expansive Time Available Time Load Perceived Situation Urgency 
Low 
Low 
2:Nominal Time Available Task Load Low 
3:Barely Adequate Time 
Available 
Time Load 
















Within the Control Room 
Communication Availability 





1:Non-Standard Other Loads High 
2:Noisy Background External Environment High 
3:Coordination Other Loads Non-task High 
4:Communicator Unavailable Communication Availability High 
5:Multiple Demands Task Load High 
6:Memory Demands Task Load High 
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